NIS2 supplier assessment for Git hosting
If your organisation falls under NIS2 (Directive (EU) 2022/2555), you need to assess the security of every service provider in your supply chain. That includes where your source code is hosted, who operates the infrastructure, and under whose jurisdiction.
This page explains how Codebahn answers those questions. We publish it rather than waiting to be asked, because you should be able to assess us before a call rather than after one.
For a plain-language overview of the directive, see the European Commission's NIS2 page.
What NIS2 requires from your suppliers
Article 21(2)(d) of NIS2 requires essential and important entities to implement "supply chain security, including security-related aspects concerning the relationships between each entity and its direct suppliers or service providers."
Article 21(3) adds that entities must take into account the vulnerabilities specific to each direct supplier and service provider, the overall quality of products and cybersecurity practices of their suppliers and service providers (including their secure development procedures), and the results of coordinated security risk assessments carried out under Article 22(1).
In practice, this means you need to know where a service provider is incorporated, where data is processed and stored, which sub-processors are involved, and what happens if the provider is disrupted or compelled to produce data.
How Codebahn answers
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| Legal entity | Hackerman AB, incorporated in Sweden. Org. nr 559079-1918, EUID SEBOLREG.5590791918 |
| Jurisdiction | Swedish and EU law. Courts of Gothenburg |
| Data at rest | Scaleway, Paris (France). Encrypted backups at Hetzner, Falkenstein (Germany) |
| Data processing | EU/EEA only (DPA 12.1) |
| Sub-processors | All EU-incorporated. Published list with 30 days' notice before changes |
| CI jobs | Hosted jobs run in Paris (France). Logs and artifacts are stored there, with encrypted backups in Falkenstein (Germany). Actions resolve from GitHub by default, so what a job downloads depends on the workflow; local mirrors cover the common ones |
| Build logs and artifacts | Kept for 90 days. Build logs are kept for up to 365 days until 15 December 2026. Details |
| CLOUD Act exposure | None. Swedish company with no US parent, and no US-incorporated sub-processor |
| Incident notification | Within 48 hours, whether or not personal data is involved (DPA 8.1 and 8.4). Within 24 hours on Assurance (addendum section 5) |
| Availability | We target 99.9% monthly uptime. This is not an SLA and carries no financial remedies; if we consistently miss it you may terminate without penalty (Terms 7.1 and 7.2). Our availability depends on the infrastructure providers listed under sub-processors. We make no availability commitment while one person staffs the Service |
| Support response | Email on Solo and Crew, with no committed response time. On Assurance, a named contact and a first response within 4 business hours if urgent, 1 business day otherwise, with no out-of-hours support (addendum section 2) |
| Continuity | One person has production access today, and no escrow is in place. We will have at least one engineer under contract by 31 December 2026. Clones, push mirrors and the organisation export are self-service. Escrow at your cost with an EU agent is available on the Custom plan. See Continuity |
| 2FA and SSO | 2FA on every account, and owners can see which members have it. Owners can require every member to enable it. SSO is not available on Crew or Assurance; it is scoped per contract on the Custom plan |
| Audit log | Organisation audit log, kept one year, exportable as CSV or JSON. Personal security log, kept 90 days. Rows cannot be changed once written. See Audit log |
| Authority cooperation | We cooperate fully with your competent and resolution authorities (Terms 17.2) |
| Exit and data return | One-click export, standard format, any time. 90 days' notice before we end the service |
| Certifications | None yet. Working towards ISO 27001, certification audits in 2027. No SOC 2. Timeline |
Compliance documentation
These are the documents a supplier assessment typically pulls from. All are published; none require a request or an NDA.
- Data Processing Agreement
- Sub-processor list
- Security and exit addendum (Assurance and Custom)
- Security overview
- Privacy policy
- Terms of Service (section 17 covers regulated customers)
- DORA register of information (financial entities)
NIS2 across member states
NIS2 is an EU directive. Each member state transposes it into national law, which means the local name, timeline, and supervisory authority vary by country. The supply chain security duty comes from the directive, and national laws can add to it.
If you are evaluating Codebahn under one of these laws, the answers above apply.
| Country | National law | In force since | Authority |
|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | Netz- und Informationssystemsicherheitsgesetz 2026 (NISG 2026), BGBl. I Nr. 94/2025 | 1 Oct 2026 | BCS |
| Belgium | Loi du 26 avril 2024 (cadre pour la cybersécurité) | 18 Oct 2024 | CCB |
| Bulgaria | Закон за киберсигурност (ДВ бр. 94/2018), amended by ДВ бр. 17/2026 | 17 Feb 2026 | MIDT |
| Croatia | Zakon o kibernetičkoj sigurnosti (NN 14/2024) | 15 Feb 2024 | NCSC-HR |
| Cyprus | Ο περί Ασφάλειας Δικτύων και Συστημάτων Πληροφοριών (Τροποποιητικός) Νόμος του 2025, Ν. 60(Ι)/2025 | 25 Apr 2025 | Digital Security Authority |
| Czechia | Zákon č. 264/2025 Sb., o kybernetické bezpečnosti | 1 Nov 2025 | NÚKIB |
| Denmark | Lov nr. 434 af 6. maj 2025 (NIS 2-loven) | 1 Jul 2025 | Digitaliseringsstyrelsen |
| Estonia | Küberturvalisuse seaduse ja teiste seaduste muutmise seadus (RT I, 30.12.2025, 4) | 1 Jan 2026 | RIA |
| Finland | Kyberturvallisuuslaki (124/2025) | 8 Apr 2025 | Traficom |
| France | Projet de loi relatif à la résilience des infrastructures critiques et au renforcement de la cybersécurité | Not yet enacted | ANSSI |
| Germany | Gesetz zur Umsetzung der NIS-2-Richtlinie und zur Regelung wesentlicher Grundzüge des Informationssicherheitsmanagements in der Bundesverwaltung (BGBl. 2025 I Nr. 301), drafted as NIS2UmsuCG | 6 Dec 2025 | BSI |
| Greece | Νόμος 5160/2024 (ΦΕΚ Α' 195/27.11.2024) | 27 Nov 2024 | NCSA |
| Hungary | 2024. évi LXIX. törvény Magyarország kiberbiztonságáról | 1 Jan 2025 | SZTFH |
| Ireland | National Cyber Security Bill | Not yet enacted | NCSC Ireland |
| Italy | Decreto Legislativo 4 settembre 2024, n. 138 | 16 Oct 2024 | ACN |
| Latvia | Nacionālās kiberdrošības likums (20.06.2024) | 1 Sep 2024 | Nacionālais kiberdrošības centrs |
| Lithuania | Kibernetinio saugumo įstatymas Nr. XII-1428, restated by Nr. XIV-2902 | 18 Oct 2024 | NKSC |
| Luxembourg | Loi du 5 mai 2026 concernant des mesures destinées à assurer un niveau élevé de cybersécurité | 10 May 2026 | ILR |
| Malta | Measures for a High Common Level of Cybersecurity across the European Union (Malta) Order, 2025 (S.L. 460.41) | 23 Jan 2026 | CIP Department and MCA |
| Netherlands | Cyberbeveiligingswet (Cbw), Stb. 2026, 187 | 15 Aug 2026 | RDI |
| Poland | Ustawa z dnia 23 stycznia 2026 r. o zmianie ustawy o krajowym systemie cyberbezpieczeństwa oraz niektórych innych ustaw (Dz.U. 2026 poz. 252) | 3 Apr 2026 | Minister Cyfryzacji |
| Portugal | Decreto-Lei n.º 125/2025, de 4 de dezembro | 3 Apr 2026 | CNCS |
| Romania | Ordonanța de urgență a Guvernului nr. 155/2024, approved by Legea nr. 124/2025 | 31 Dec 2024 | DNSC |
| Slovakia | Zákon č. 69/2018 Z. z. o kybernetickej bezpečnosti, amended by zákon č. 366/2024 Z. z. | 1 Jan 2025 | NBÚ |
| Slovenia | Zakon o informacijski varnosti (ZInfV-1), Uradni list RS 40/2025 | 19 Jun 2025 | URSIV |
| Spain | Anteproyecto de Ley de Coordinación y Gobernanza de la Ciberseguridad | Not yet enacted | INCIBE |
| Sweden | Cybersäkerhetslag (SFS 2025:1506) | 15 Jan 2026 | PTS |
The date is when the law took effect; registration and security duties often apply later. The authority shown is the body for digital and ICT providers or the national NIS2 authority, and your sector may have its own supervisor. NIS2 is not yet part of the EEA Agreement: Norway (Digitalsikkerhetsloven) and Iceland apply laws based on NIS1, and Liechtenstein's Cyber-Sicherheitsgesetz follows NIS2, with its reference to the directive taking effect only with the EEA decision. Table verified October 2026. Dates and names may change as legislation is amended.
Where we are the wrong supplier
We hold no SOC 2 or ISO 27001. Audit rights are those in section 11 of the DPA, documentation first; we cannot offer inspection rights beyond them or participate in threat-led penetration testing.
We cannot host classified information at any level (RESTREINT, NATO RESTRICTED or above), or technical data under export controls that require the provider to be unable to read it, such as ITAR or the EAR carve-out. We hold the encryption keys and can technically read Customer Data, and our Terms (section 4.1) say so.
If your supplier assessment requires any of these, we are the wrong choice today, and it is better to learn that on this page than in month three of a procurement. If what you need is written commitments rather than an audit report, the Assurance plan publishes them.
If you are a financial entity under DORA, the DORA register page has the specific fields your register needs.
Questions about NIS2 compliance: hello@codebahn.net.
